## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-117

KENDRICK R. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. BOBBITT, Deputy Warden of Security; CAPTAIN S. JACKSON; FREDDIE DAVIS, CERT Sergeant; FNU CLEMENTE, CERT; FNU GOETIE, CERT; M. ANDERSON, Major of Security; FNU ALLEN, CERT; FNU WATKINS, CERT; and FNU ZIMMIMAN, CERT,

Defendants.

## ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel, (doc. 29), and Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings, (doc. 30). Based on the foregoing, the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff's Motion and **GRANTS** Defendants' Motion.

## I. Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 29)

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel seeking assistance in this case. (Doc. 29.) In this civil case, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Wright v. Langford, 562 F. App'x 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)). "Although a court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff, it has broad discretion in making this decision, and should appoint counsel only in exceptional circumstances." Id. (citing Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320). Appointment of counsel in a civil case is a "privilege that is justified only by exceptional

circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner." Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987), and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that "the key" to assessing whether counsel should be appointed "is whether the *pro se* litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or her position to the court. Where the facts and issues are simple, he or she usually will not need such help." McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App'x 456, 457 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)).

The Court has reviewed the record and pleadings in this case and finds no "exceptional circumstances" warranting the appointment of counsel. While the Court understands that Plaintiff is incarcerated, this Court has repeatedly found that "prisoners do not receive special consideration notwithstanding the challenges of litigating a case while incarcerated." Hampton v. Peeples, No. CV 614-104, 2015 WL 4112435, at \*2 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2015). "Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld district courts' decisions to refuse appointment of counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions similar to this case for want of exceptional circumstances." Id. (citing Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. App'x 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 2015); Wright, 562 F. App'x at 777; Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 523 F. App'x 696, 702 (11th Cir. 2013); McDaniels, 405 F. App'x at 457; Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. App'x 410, 414 (11th Cir. 2010); Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1091, 1096; and Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174). This case is not so complex legally or factually to prevent Plaintiff from presenting "the essential merits of his position" to the Court.

For these reasons, the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff's Motion.

## II. Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 30)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) He is proceeding *pro se*. On November 22, 2016, Defendants filed a pre-answer Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 26.) Defendants have now moved to stay discovery in this case until that Motion is resolved. Upon careful consideration, the Court **GRANTS** Defendants' Motion to Stay. (Doc. 30.)

With regard to the timing of discovery, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that:

[i]f the district court dismisses a nonmeritorious claim before discovery has begun, unnecessary costs to the litigants and to the court system can be avoided. Conversely, delaying ruling on a motion to dismiss such a claim until after the parties complete discovery encourages abusive discovery and, if the court ultimately dismisses the claim, imposes unnecessary costs. For these reasons, any legally unsupported claim that would unduly enlarge the scope of discovery should be eliminated before the discovery stage, if possible.

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) (footnotes omitted). For these reasons, this Court, and other courts within the Eleventh Circuit, routinely find good cause to stay the discovery period where there is a pending motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Habib v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:10-cv-04079-SCJ-RGV, 2011 WL 2580971, at \*6 n.4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2011) (citing Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1368) ("[T]here is good cause to stay discovery obligations until the District Judge rules on [the defendant's] motion to dismiss to avoid undue expense to both parties."); Berry v. Canady, No. 2:09-cv-765-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 806230, at \*1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2011) (quoting Moore v. Potter, 141 F. App'x 803, 807 (11th Cir. 2005)) ("[N]either the parties nor the court have any need for discovery before the court rules on the motion [to dismiss].").

In the case at hand, the Court finds that good cause exists to stay this case until such time as a ruling is made on Defendants" Motion and that no prejudice will accrue to the parties if Defendants' request is granted. Specifically, a ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss before

the commencement of discovery may save the parties time and resources by clarifying what issues the parties will need to address in discovery.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY **ORDERED** that all proceedings, including discovery, are stayed pending a ruling by the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, at which time a discovery schedule will be entered as to any claims that may remain. This ruling does not affect Plaintiff's obligation to file a response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

**SO ORDERED**, this 7th day of December, 2016.

R. STAN BAKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA